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NOTES
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The peremptory challenge,' once defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court as a challenge "exercised without a reason stated, without
inquiry and without being subject to the court's control,"2 no
longer exists in the American judicial system. In Batson v. Ken-
tucky4 and its progeny,5 the Supreme Court ignored common
sense and bastardized the English language by redefining the
peremptory challenge to represent its antithesis.' This jurispru-
dence, which retains the peremptory challenge in name only, has
forced trial court judges to traverse a difficult path through the
complexities of equal protection claims, the uniqueness of third
party standing, the dilemma of whose rights to protect, and the
opaque pretext behind parties' alleged neutral use of the pe-
remptory challenge.
1. The peremptory challenge is a challenge instituted by a party, in either a civil
or criminal case, to strike a potential juror. The challenge is "peremptory" because it
requires no explanation for its use. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY 67 (1986); see also infra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the
institution of the venire and the voir dire process).
2. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
3. That is, the peremptory challenge no longer exists as defined by the Supreme
Court in 1965. The peremptory does continue to exist, at least in name, in every
American jurisdiction. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in
Jury Selection: Whose Right is it, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 726 n.3 (1992).
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
6. One scholar wrote of the Batson decision:
Batson represents a well-intentioned effort to eliminate the pernicious ef-
fects of discrimination in the petit jury system. The solution proffered by
the Court, however, has resulted in a quagmire. What Batson wrought
was an "enforcement nightmare." By narrowly limiting the peremptory
challenge, the majority created more problems than it solved.
ALFREDo GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 194
(1992).
961
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
These knotty concerns most recently surfaced in a split be-
tween the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.7 The split resulted from
the unconstitutional use of peremptory challenges in United
States v. Boyd8 and United States v. Huey.' The defendants in
both cases used their peremptory challenges to strike prospec-
tive jurors solely because of the prospective jurors' race."0 The
courts differed, however, as to whether the defendants should be
granted new trials due to their unconstitutional employment of
the peremptory challenges." This circuit split stands as a testa-
ment to the Supreme Court's misguided jurisprudence that
made the long-standing peremptory challenge irrational and
functionally obsolete. 2
This Note will address the Supreme Court's whittling away of
the peremptory challenge and the confusion that has resulted
from its opinions. The first portion of the Note will detail the
history of the peremptory challenge, 3 devoting particular atten-
tion to the Court's treatment of the peremptory, from its opinion
in Swain v. Alabama, to its most recent cases decided in the
wake of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.'5 The second part of this
Note will explain the facts and holdings in United States v. Huey
and United States v. Boyd and detail to what extent the cases
may be factually distinguishable. 6 The Fifth and Seventh
Circuits' holdings will be held as indicia of a greater confusion
stemming from Supreme Court jurisprudence. This Note will
then predict the probable outcome should the Supreme Court
decide to resolve the issue raised by the circuit split.' The
7. See John Flynn Rooney, 7th Circuit Rejects Batson Claim Pitting Defendant
Against His Own Attorney, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 17, 1996, at 1.
8. 86 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1825 (1997).
9. 76 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 1996).
10. See Boyd, 86 F.3d at 721; Huey, 76 F.3d at 639-40.
11. See Boyd, 86 F.3d at 724 ("Our conclusion that the exercise of a peremptory
challenge by the defense, in violation of Batson and McCollum, does not entitle the
defendant to a new trial ... places us in respectful disagreement with United
States v. Huey.").
12. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 20-73 and accompanying text.
14. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
15. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
16. See infra notes 74-110 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 111-39 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court denied cer-
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third part of this Note will analyze the options available to the
Supreme Court in resolving the problems many critics see in the
Court's current treatment of the peremptory challenge.18 Fi-
nally, this Note will conclude by presenting the most logical,
though admittedly unlikely, course for the future of the peremp-
tory challenge. 9
HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The Peremptory Challenge v. the "For Cause" Challenge
To understand the history of the peremptory challenge, it
must first be distinguished from its counterpart, the "for cause"
challenge. Traditionally, the peremptory challenge permitted a
party to strike a member of the venire"° without needing to ex-
plain to the court the reasoning for the strike."' In contrast, the
for cause challenge demands that a party give a "narrowly speci-
fied, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality" for the
tiorari to the Seventh Circuit case in May 1997. See Boyd v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 1825 (1997), denying cert. to 86 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit case,
however, was not appealed.
18. See infra notes 140-217 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 218-32 and accompanying text.
20. The 'venire" refers to the panel of prospective jurors. See JAMES P. LEVINE,
JURIES AND POLITICS 44 (1992). Prior to the start of a trial, the court provides a
venire from which the final jury will be selected. See id. The people composing the
venire are selected though different methods depending upon the state. Often, the
citizens called to be on the venire are chosen from voter registration lists. See id.
Once the court provides the venire, the parties proceed with voir dire. See id. at 47.
Voir dire, which translated means "to speak the truth," WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD
H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3, at 969 (2d ed. 1992) consists of the court,
the parties, or both asking questions to the venire in an attempt to weed out biased
jurors. See Marie Adornetto Monahan, Judicial Management of a Civil Jury Trial, 37
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 313, 343 (1993). The judge has the discretion to define the scope
and duration of the voir dire. See id. During voir dire, the parties may ask to have
a prospective juror removed for cause. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 67.
Furthermore, the court, itself, may strike a juror for cause. See id. No matter who
initiates a for cause challenge, the court determines the sufficiency and validity of
the challenge. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, § 22.3, at 973. Also during the voir dire
process, the parties may exercise their peremptory strikes. See HANS & VIDMAR, su-
pra note 1, at 67. The process for exercising these strikes differs greatly from state
to state. See id.
21. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 67.
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strike.22 Litigants often ground for cause challenges on a pro-
spective juror's familial or social relationship to one of the par-
ties, failure to meet statutory qualifications for jury duty, or oth-
er specific evidence of bias."
The peremptory and for cause challenges also differ in the
number allowed by the courts. A party may exercise an unlimit-
ed number of for cause challenges.' Peremptory challenges,
however, are limited to the number specified by statute in the
jurisdiction.' The federal courts limit a litigant to three pe-
remptory challenges in civil cases,26 while allowing the govern-
ment six peremptory challenges and the defendant ten peremp-
tory challenges in felony cases. 7 In misdemeanor cases, each
side receives three peremptory challenges. 8 Most states have
similar statutory grants of peremptory challenges.29
Although judges, scholars, and litigants often disagree over
whether the peremptory challenge serves a worthwhile purpose
in the American judicial system," all seem to admit that no
constitutional basis exists for the peremptory challenge. Indeed,
the Court in Stilson v. Lewis3 wrote that "[tihere is nothing in
the Constitution of the United States which requires the Con-
gress to grant peremptory challenges."32 Unlike peremptory
challenges, a trial judge cannot revoke for cause challenges be-
cause they are grounded in the Sixth Amendment's right to an
impartial jury.3 The peremptory challenge, therefore, when
22. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
23. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 526 (2d ed. 1993); LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, supra note 20, § 22.3, at 973.
24. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 140 (1977).
25. See id.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1989); FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b).
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). Both the government and the defendant may use
20 peremptory challenges in criminal cases if the charge is a capital offense. See id.
28. See id.
29. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 20, § 22.3, at 978.
30. Disagreements exist even between Supreme Court Justices regarding the legit-
imacy of the peremptory challenge. The Court did not announce its landmark deci-
sion in Batson v. Kentucky with a unified voice; there were seven different opinions
written. See 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Justice Marshall's concurring opinion went so far as
to argue for the abolishment of the peremptory challenge. See id. at 102-03 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
31. 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
32. Id. at 586.
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that the accused in criminal cases shall
964 [Vol. 39:961
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isolated from all of its adopted uses, is simply a tool to create an
impartial jury.' It is for this reason that the Court has allowed
trial judges to strip the parties of their peremptory challenges
when the creation of an impartial jury has already been as-
sured. 5 The peremptory challenge thus stands along side the
for cause challenge to defend litigants from juror bias.
The Evolution of the Peremptory Challenge
To understand the current state of the peremptory challenge,
it is necessary to unfold its long history. Few institutions of the
trial court have as distinguished and time-tested a history as
the peremptory challenge." Scholars believe that the peremp-
tory was born over 700 years ago." The peremptory traveled
with the colonists to America where it soon grew beyond its Eng-
lish heritage.8 From the inception of the United States, few
questioned the use of the peremptory challenge until 1965 when
the Court decided Swain v. Alabama.3 9
have the right to a trial by an impartial jury). This right to an impartial jury ex-
tends into the civil arena. Logic dictates that if a party has a right to an impartial
jury, the court must act upon all challenges for cause that the party can prove. Pe-
remptory challenges differ in that they offer the court no proof of bias or impartiali-
ty. If a peremptory challenge's proponent were able to show impartiality or bias on
the part of a prospective juror, then the challenge would rightfully be a for cause
challenge. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
34. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992).
35. See Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 & n.11 (1948) ("The right is
in the nature of a statutory privilege, variable in the number of challenges allowed,
which may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guaranties of
'an impartial jury' and a fair trial."); Stilson, 250 U.S. at 586 ("[Trial by an impar-
tial jury is all that is secured.").
36. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The peremptory's importance is confirmed by its persistence: it was
well established at the time of Blackstone and continues to endure in all the
States.").
37. See Christopher M. Ferdico, Note, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge:
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1177, 1177 (1995).
38. See VAN DYKE, supra note 24, at 148-49. For a discussion of the English sys-
tem, see Roger D. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: The English Practice, 16
GEO. L.J. 438, 444-48 (1928).
39. In the years between the founding of our country and 1965, the Supreme
Court and Congress did not completely ignore the peremptory challenge. On the con-
trary, Congress and the Supreme Court gradually expanded the use and role of the
peremptory. See VAN DYKE, supra note 24, at 149-50. The defendant's use of pe-
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In a six to three decision, the Court in Swain held that Ala-
bama did not violate the defendant's equal protection rights
when it employed its peremptory challenges to strike black ju-
rors. ° The Court arrived at this conclusion by stating:
In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and
white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being
challenged without cause. To subject the prosecutor's chal-
lenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional
standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radi-
cal change in the nature and operation of the challenge. The
challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory, each
and every challenge being open to examination, either at the
time of the challenge or at a hearing afterwards.41
The Court held that a defendant could successfully challenge a
state's use of the peremptory challenge only by showing that the
state discriminatorily excluded blacks from petit juries over a
period of time.42 A defendant's showing of such a discriminatory
use of the peremptory constitutes a "prima facie case under the
Fourteenth Amendment['s]" 4 Equal Protection Clause." By
remptory challenges was well accepted from the start. See id. at 148. The
prosecution's practice of "standing jurors aside" initially received more skepticism.
See id. A forerunner of the modern peremptory challenge exercised by the prosecu-
tion was "standing aside," a practice that originated in England and that entailed
the prosecution "standing aside" jurors whom it considered objectionable. See id. at
148-49. If 12 jurors could be assembled, then the prosecution would never need to
show cause for those jurors who were asked to stand aside. See id. at 148. In 1827,
Justice Story gave the U.S. Supreme Court's approval for the practice of standing
aside. See id. at 149 (explaining the dicta in United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 480, 483 (1827)). The peremptory challenge, or its functional equivalent of
standing aside, thus quickly established itself in the American legal system.
By the mid-nineteenth century, most states had adopted laws allowing for pe-
remptory challenges to be used by the prosecution; this effectively ended the need
for standing aside. See id. at 150. "By the beginning of the twentieth century, the
government's right to exercise peremptory challenges was firmly established." Id.
40. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1965).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 223-24.
43. Id. at 224.
44. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause states that "[no State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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placing this weighty burden of proof upon the defendant, the
Court effectively rid itself of equal protection claims based upon
the state's behavior in any one trial.
It was not until twenty years later that the Supreme Court
revisited the peremptory challenge issue in its tide-turning
Batson v. Kentucky45 decision. The defendant in Batson claimed
the prosecutor violated his rights under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments by using his peremptory challenges to
strike all four black members of the venire.46 The remaining
all-white jury found the black defendant guilty."' The Court fo-
cused its attentions upon the defendant's equal protection
claim.4" In overruling Swain,49 the Court found that it was not
only the defendant who suffered when a court allowed race-
based challenges; the excluded jurors and the community at
large also felt the sting of discrimination."
To detect future race-based, unconstitutional uses of the pe-
remptory challenge, the Supreme Court created a three-part test
that courts continue to use today.5 First, the defendant must
show that the circumstances surrounding a particular challenge
create a prima facie case that the prosecutor challenged the
45. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
46. See id. at 83.
47. See id.
48. In fact, the Court did not address the defendant's Sixth Amendment claim to
the right to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community other than to state
in a footnote that "we have never held that the Sixth Amendment requires that 'pe-
tit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various dis-
tinctive groups in the population. Id. at 85-86 n.6 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
49. The Court overruled Swain to the extent that Swain allowed a defendant to
show discriminatory jury selection only through the strike process by showing a
history of such discrimination in that locality. The Court in Batson allowed the de-
fendant to prove discrimination without removing the analysis from the confines of
the trial at hand. See id. at 90-93.
50. See id. at 87. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Powell wrote that the
Court first recognized the equal protection rights of excluded jurors in Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. Powell also claimed
that discriminatory jury selection processes "undermine public confidence in the fair-
ness of our system of justice." I&
51. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 640-41 (5th
Cir. 1996) (applying Batson's three-part test). The Court rejected Swain's "crippling
burden of proof' necessary to prove a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the
use of peremptory challenges. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
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potential juror on the basis of race.52 Once the defendant estab-
lishes this prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts
to the proponent of the peremptory challenge to provide a race-
neutral reason for exercising the challenge." Finally, the trial
court must then determine whether the opponent of the strike
has proved purposeful discrimination.'
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the deep and
firmly rooted foundations of the peremptory.55 Chief Justice Bur-
ger took pains to differentiate the case at bar from cases involving
wholesale juror exclusion. 6 Using a peremptory challenge to ex-
clude individual jurors based on the facts in a particular case is
vastly different from excluding an entire class of people from
being eligible to be in the initial venire.57 Justice Rehnquist ech-
oed Chief Justice Burger's complaints, emphasizing that "there is
simply nothing 'unequal' about the State's using its peremptory
challenges to strike blacks" because all other races and ethnic
groups are subject to the same treatment.58
The cases following in Batson's aftermath only served to wid-
en Batson's scope. In the 1991 case of Powers v. Ohio," the
Court held that Ohio violated a white defendant's rights when it
exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude seven black ju-
rors.6" Unlike in Batson, however, the Court spent the vast ma-
jority of its opinion justifying the holding based on the wrongs
52. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96. A defendant may establish the prima facie case
by proving that he is a member of a "cognizable racial group" whose members the
prosecutor attempted to exclude. Id at 96. Finally, the defendant must convince the
court that the prosecutor's actions raise an inference that the peremptory challenges
were based on race. See id. In later years, the Court extended this test by holding
that the opponent of the strike need not be of the same race as the excluded jurors.
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
53. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
54. See id. at 98.
55. See id. at 119 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 122-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. See id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
58. Id. at 137 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
60. See id. at 403-04. The decision echoed the Court's concerns expressed in
Batson for the rights of the defendant and the excluded jurors, as well as public
confidence in the judicial system. See id. at 406 ("Batson recognized that a
prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors
and the community at large.").
968 [Vol. 39:961
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suffered by the excluded jurors and not upon the rights of the
criminal defendant.6 That same year, the Court held in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.62  that the prohibition
against using race-based peremptory strikes should also apply in
civil cases.63 The following year in Georgia v. McCollum,' the
Court extended Batson to encompass race-based peremptory
challenges exercised by defendants in criminal trials.65 The
most recent extension of Batson occurred in J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B.66 The Court in J.E.B. held that gender, like race, is
an impermissible basis for peremptory challenges.67
Despite many observers' expectations that the Court will ex-
tend Batson beyond race and gender discrimination,6 the Court
61. See id. at 406-10.
62. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
63. See id. at 619. In reaching this conclusion, the Court necessarily had to find
that the use of race-based peremptory challenges by private litigants is somehow
equivalent to the use of such challenges by a government actor. See id. at 618-19.
The need for this finding stemmed from the fact that "[t]he Constitution's protections
of individual liberty and equal protection apply in general only to action by the gov-
ernment." Id. at 619. In reasoning that the private litigant's peremptory strikes were
unconstitutional under Batson, the Court noted that the government supplies the
forum, the judge, and the jury to make the use of the unconstitutional challenges
possible. See id. at 622. Despite the absence of the government at the defendant's or
plaintiff's tables, the government takes an active role in the civil trial process. See
id. at 622-24.
64. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
65. See id. at 59. This decision gave the Batson prohibition on race-based
challenges a clean sweep: After McCollum, all parties in both civil and criminal cas-
es may not strike prospective jurors on account of race. In arriving at this decision,
the Supreme Court had to trudge through the quagmires first traversed in its earli-
er decisions of Batson, Powers, and Edmonson. The Court noted that:
The majority in Powers recognized that "Batson 'was designed to
"serve multiple ends,"' only one of which was to protect individual defen-
dants from discrimination in the selection of jurors." As in Powers and
Edmonson, the extension of Batson in this context is designed to remedy
the harm done to the "dignity of persons" and to the "integrity of the
courts."
Id. at 48 (citations omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 406 (1991)).
The Court justified its conclusion that a defendant's use of discriminatory perempto-
ry challenges constitutes state action for purposes of equal protection analysis by
adopting the rationale from Edmonson. See id. at 50-55; see also supra note 63 (dis-
cussing Edmonson's rationale for this conclusion).
66. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
67. See id. at 146.
68. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After
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has not yet chosen to do so. In Hernandez v. New York,69 the Court
refused to find fault with a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes
to exclude two bilingual jurors whom the prosecutor feared would
not be able to listen to an interpreter while blocking out what was
said by Spanish-speaking witnesses." In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Kennedy held that the peremptory challenges were
race-neutral, despite the defendant's assertion that the prosecutor
unfairly excluded Latinos.7 In another case, Davis v. Minneso-
ta,72 the Court denied certiorari to a case involving a prosecutor's
use of a peremptory to exclude a Jehovah's Witness."'
The Court's recent refusals to extend the Batson holding to other
historically protected classifications leaves an unanswered ques-
tion as to the scope and process of jury selection. By failing to ex-
tend the reasoning of Batson to these classes, questions remain as
to whom specifically Batson protects. The conflicting opinions in
United States v. Huey and United States v. Boyd present an equally
puzzling question: Specifically, what are the remedies for
defendants' illicit use of race-based challenges?
HUEY AND BoYD
The ever-expanding holding in Batson forces the lower courts to
stand upon a shifting foundation while parties further try to push
the limits of the Supreme Court's prior holdings. One of the most
recent examples of litigants' efforts to profit from the Batson analy-
sis met with mixed results in Boyd and Huey.74
Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First
Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REV. 191, 193 (1995) (arguing that Batson should
be extended to help prevent religious discrimination in jury selection); Peter Michael
Collins, Note, Taking Batson One Giant Step Further: The Court Prohibits Gender-
Based Peremptory Challenges in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 44 CATH. U. L. REV.
935, 974-76 (1995) (musing that the next step for the Court may be to extend
Batson to cover illegitimacy-based challenges).
69. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
70. See id. at 356-57, 372.
71. See id. at 360-61. Justice Kennedy stated that the Court did not need to con-
sider the "high correlation between Spanish-language ability and ethnicity" because
the two excluded jurors' attitudes and responses to the prosecutor's questions served
as legitimate grounds for the prosecutor's challenges. Id. at 360.
72. 511 U.S. 1115 (1994), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993).
73. See Davis, 511 U.S. at 1115; infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
74. The defendant in Boyd did not enjoy the same benefit from his appeal of his
970 [Vol. 39:961
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United States v. Huey
In United States v. Huey, Antonio Garcia, a Hispanic Ameri-
can, and Arthur Huey, a Caucasian, both pled not guilty to a
three-count indictment for drug and weapons charges. 5 At the
close of voir dire and prior to the exercise of peremptory strikes,
Huey's counsel moved to strike six potential jurors who were
either black or had Hispanic surnames.7" Knowing that the gov-
ernment intended to introduce audio tapes that not only linked
the defendants to the crimes but also captured the defendants
issuing threats laced with "harsh and offensive racial epithets,"
counsel for Huey argued that black and Hispanic jurors would
be unable to reach an unbiased verdict." The court denied the
motion to exclude the jurors. 8
Determined to protect his client from the perceived inevitable
bias of the prospective minority jurors, Huey's counsel used the
five peremptory strikes allotted to Huey 9 to strike five of the
black jurors." Garcia, Huey's codefendant, objected to Huey's
peremptory strikes.81 Although, the trial judge granted Huey's
unconstitutional use of the peremptory challenge as did the two defendants in Huey.
The Seventh Circuit denied defendant Boyd a new trial, see United States v. Boyd,
86 F.3d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1825 (1997), but the
Fifth Circuit was much more generous to defendants Huey and Garcia as it granted
them both a new trial due to Huey's illicit use of his peremptory challenges. See
United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1996).
75. See Huey, 76 F.3d at 639.
76. See id.
77. Id. Prior to trial, the court denied a motion in limine filed by Huey's counsel.
The motion asked for the exclusion of the inflammatory audio tapes, but the court
ruled that the jury should hear the tapes. See id. at 639 n.2.
78. See id. at 639. Despite the court's refusal to grant the motion, the court did
proceed to inform the venire that tapes would be introduced into evidence that con-
tained racial slurs. See id. The judge asked whether any of the prospective jurors
would not be able to make an unbiased decision because of the slurs; none of the
jurors responded that the tapes would affect their decisions of guilt or innocence. See
id.
79. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defense in a felony case
receives 10 peremptory challenges. See FED. R. ClRn. P. 24(b); supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
80. See Huey, 76 F.3d at 639-40.
81. See id. at 639-40. Over both Garcia's and the government's objections, counsel
for Huey used three of the five peremptory challenges at his first opportunity. See
id. at 639. During the second round of strikes, Huey's counsel struck two more black
jurors, but only Garcia's counsel objected. See id. at 640.
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counsel an opportunity to state a race-neutral reason for strik-
ing five black venire members, the court did not demand a
reason to be stated.82 The court allowed the strikes, proceeded
with the trial, and eventually convicted the two defendants.'
Both defendants appealed their convictions to the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals." Garcia and Huey challenged their
convictions on the grounds that the district court erred because
it did not defend the equal protection rights of the five exclud-
ed black jurors.85 The appeals court found that when counsel
for Garcia objected to the peremptory strikes, it had satisfied
the first inquiry of the Batson three-part test by showing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.86 By not demanding
a race-neutral reason for the strikes or not disallowing the
strikes, the district court failed to protect the rights of the
excluded jurors. Ruling that the district court committed
reversible error, the appellate court granted both defendants a
new trial.88
The Fifth Circuit did not fail to foresee how some critics
might view the act of granting a new trial to a defendant who
had been convicted despite his own deliberate error. The court
noted:
We are not unaware that there is some irony in reversing
Huey's conviction given that it was his counsel who made
the discriminatory strikes. We are convinced, however, that
this result is consistent with the teachings of Batson and
its progeny. In addition to harming individual defendants
82. See id. at 641.
83. See id. at 640.
84. See id. at 639.
85. See id. at 640. Huey joined Garcia in the appeal of the lower court's ruling.
See id.
86. See id. at 641.
87. See id. The appeals court held that Garcia had standing to bring a claim on
behalf of the excluded jurors due to his codefendant's unconstitutional use of pe-
remptory challenges. See id. at 640.
88. See id. at 641. In a later decision, the Fifth Circuit explained that it granted
Huey a new trial only after determining that Garcia deserved a new trial. See Mata
v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1271 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated in part on reh'g by 105 F.3d
209 (5th Cir. 1997). The court reasoned that the "financial and emotional burden on
the community" would not be increased significantly by retrying Huey along with
Garcia. Id.
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and prospective jurors, racial discrimination in the selection
of jurors impugns the integrity of the judicial system and
the community at large. 9
The court discounted concerns that future defendants might pur-
posely exclude certain jurors knowing that they would be grant-
ed a new trial even if the strategy resulted in a conviction. 0
The court stated that "such mischief could be avoided by trial
courts if the judges practiced "diligent oversight and sound judg-
ment" by means of applying "the well-known three-step inquiry
for ensuring race-neutral use of peremptory challenges."9'
United States v. Boyd
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied a vastly differ-
89. Huey, 76 F.3d at 641. It was not until the Fifth Circuit's later opinion in
Mata v. Johnson that it became clear how the court decides whether to grant a new
trial to a defendant who wrongfully excludes prospective jurors. See Mata, 99 F.3d
at 1270-71. In Mata, the prosecutor and defense, with the court's direct or implied
consent, agreed to exclude all eight black veniremen from the jury. See id. at 1268-
69. The exclusion of the jurors was not accomplished by use of peremptory chal-
lenges; the court, therefore, could not apply a traditional Batson analysis. See id. at
1270. The court recognized that because the defendant agreed with the prosecution
to exclude the black veniremen, the defendant had committed his own constitutional
violation. See id.
The Fifth Circuit stated that if the agreement to exclude jurors violated the
defendant's rights, it was not actionable because those rights had been waived by
his collusive actions. See id. The court also found the harm to the excluded jurors
not to be actionable because the trial had occurred over 10 years previously. See id
The court focused its attention on the integrity of the judicial system while admit-
ting that harm would be done regardless of whether it granted the defendant a new
trial. See id. In the end, the court applied a balancing test and decided not to grant
a new trial. See id. at 1270-71. The court believed the harm done to the integrity of
the judicial system by granting a convicted murderer a new trial based on his own
unconstitutional actions would be worse than the harm done to the judicial system
by allowing this unconstitutional exclusion of jurors to pass without punishment or
remedy. See id.
90. See Huey, 76 F.3d at 642.
91. Id. Two of the judges on the three-judge panel filed a concurring opinion con-
cerning what they believed was "an indisputable abuse of the Batson v. Kentucky
rule by the defendant." See id. (Jolly, J., concurring). The concurrence affirmed the
belief that abuses such as those present in Huey must be avoided in the future
through "the diligence of trial judges." Id. (Jolly, J., concurring). The concurrence
further noted that this decision would harm the "public trust" because, through its
holding, the court permitted a convicted criminal to receive "a new trial based on
his own abuse of the judicial system." Id. (Jolly, J., concurring).
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ent treatment to an appeal similar to that in Huey. In United
States v. Boyd, the defendant appealed from a bank robbery
conviction.92 During jury selection in the trial court, counsel for
Boyd used a peremptory challenge to strike the only black per-
son in the venire.9' The defendant did not protest, and the gov-
ernment did not object to the peremptory strike. 4 It was not
until the sentencing process that it became clear that the pe-
remptory challenge had been race-based.95 Like the defendants
in Huey, Boyd claimed that his counsel's use of race-based pe-
remptory strikes entitled him to a new trial."
Judge Easterbrook, writing the opinion for the court, quickly
disposed of Boyd's contention that he should be granted a new
trial due to the unconstitutional challenge exercised by his coun-
sel. Easterbrook wrote:
How can Boyd protest his agent's-which is to say, his own-
-tactical decision? Many a defendant would like to plant an
error and grow a risk-free trial: an acquittal is irrevocable
under the double jeopardy clause, and a conviction can be set
aside. But steps the court takes at the defendant's behest are
not reversible, because they are not error; even the "plain
error" doctrine does not ride to the rescue when the choice
has been made deliberately, and the right in question has
been waived rather than forfeitedY
The court explained that a peremptory challenge is not a fun-
damental or personal right of the accused;98 it is a tactical
92. See United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1825 (1997).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id, During sentencing, counsel for Boyd told the court that he excluded
the one black member of the venire because he thought that all of the white jurors
would naturally defer to the reasoning and decision of the one black juror. See id.
Counsel confided that he did not want the entire case hinging upon the decision of
one juror. See id. Defendant Boyd, on appeal, claimed that his counsel told him that
the black juror should be struck because a middle-class black person would be more
likely to convict a lower-class black person. See id. The court stated that the reason
for which Boyd's counsel exercised the peremptory strike was of no matter, as both
.are forbidden grounds for removing jurors." Id.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 721-22 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)).
98. See id. at 722-24. The court differentiated the peremptory challenge from a
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weapon to be used by counsel.99 "Decisions on selection of a
jury are among the many entrusted to counsel rather than to
defendants personally."' It is precisely because peremptory
challenges are not fundamental or personal rights that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow a judge to divide up
the number of peremptory challenges available if there is more
than one defendant.'
The court admitted that its holding would place it in direct
disagreement with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals;0 2 howev-
er, Judge Easterbrook claimed that the Fifth Circuit's holding
was a "non-sequitur" to the extent that it granted a new trial to a
convicted criminal based on an attack of his own course of ac-
tion.' Stating that "[g]iving a defendant a new trial because of
his own violation of the Constitution would make a laughingstock
of the judicial process," the court affirmed Boyd's conviction. 0 4
truly personal right such as the right to remain silent. See id. at 722-23.
99. See id. at 723.
100. Id.
101. See id. ("Peremptory challenges under Fed. R.Crim.P. 24(b) belong to a 'side,'
not to a person. When there is more than one defendant, the court may require the
defendants to exercise their challenges collectively, which is incompatible with the
idea that challenges are personal, non-delegable choices."). By its act of dividing the
allotted peremptory challenges between the two defendants, the court in Huey im-
plicitly recognized the tactical, not fundamental, nature of peremptory challenges. See
United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 639 (5th Cir. 1996).
102. See Boyd, 86 F.3d at 724.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 725. In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit introduced what it
considered to be "parallel situations" to the case at bar in which the defendant com-
mitted his own error. See id. The court noted that a defendant who commits perju-
ry, in a mistaken belief that his lie will work towards his acquittal, cannot receive a
new trial based upon the error. See id. Even though the prevention of peijury is in
the interest of the judicial system, a new trial, while erasing the effects of the per-
jury, would grant the accused another chance at acquittal. The court also stated that
when multiple defendants in a single case waive their right to have separate counsel
and their claims to a possible conflict of interest, they may not subsequently demand
a new trial based on the judicial system's interest in preventing joint representation.
See id.
A few months after the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Boyd, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court likewise refused to follow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Huey.
See State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218 (La. 1996). In Strickland, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court rejected an appeal on Batson grounds from a defendant found guilty of
first-degree murder. See id. at 230. The defendant claimed there was a Batson viola-
tion when his trial counsel struck seven men with the eight peremptory challenges
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Differences Between Huey and Boyd
Before contrasting the disparate treatments of the two cases by
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, it is important to clarify the ways
in which the cases may be distinguishable. First, and most obvi-
ously, the cases differ in that there were two defendants in Huey
while only one in Boyd.105 Whereas defendant Boyd appealed his
case based on his own error, defendants Huey and Garcia ap-
pealed due to the peremptory challenges exercised exclusively by
Huey.' ° To the extent that a court divides peremptory challeng-
es among codefendants and the codefendants exercise the pe-
remptory challenges as one actor, the Fifth Circuit's grant of a
new trial seems to run directly against the Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing in Boyd. If, however, the court treats the codefendants as
independently exercising their challenges, then the holding in
Huey seems distinguishable from Boyd only to the extent that the
court granted defendant Huey a new trial. °7
A second difference between Boyd and Huey lies in the fact
that there was no objection to the unconstitutional peremptory
challenge in Boyd.' Without a challenge to the peremptory,
he exercised. See id. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
Huey fails entirely to persuade, standing as it does for the proposition
that a defendant can both violate the constitutional rights of veniremen
and the state's right to a fair trial, and subsequently, if acquittal has not
put him safely out of reach on double jeopardy grounds, claim error and
receive a new trial.
Id. In criticizing the Fifth Circuit's holding in Huey, the Louisiana Supreme Court
explicitly embraced the Seventh Circuit's decision in Boyd. See id.
105. See id. at 721; Huey, 76 F.3d at 639.
106. See Boyd, 86 F.3d at 721; Huey, 76 F.3d at 639-40.
107. If Huey and Garcia exercised their peremptory challenges not as one party,
but rather, as two individual defendants, then it might easily be argued that Garcia
should receive a new trial while Huey should not. Huey unconstitutionally exercised
the five peremptory challenges allotted to him, see Huey, 76 F.3d at 641, whereas
Garcia objected to all five of Huey's race-based peremptory challenges. See id. at
639-40. In Mata v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit further explained its holding in Huey.
See Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1271 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated in part on reh'g
by 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997). The court acknowledged that "there was no ques-
tion but that the case had to be retried with respect to [Garcia]." Id. at 1271. The
only true question was whether Huey should receive a trial.
108. See Boyd, 86 F.3d at 721. Neither the Government, nor Boyd, objected when
Boyd's counsel peremptorily struck the one black member of the venire. See id. It
was not until the sentencing process that it became apparent that Boyd's counsel
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the district court in Boyd never had to employ the three-part
Batson test, and the defendant never had to offer a race-neutral
reason for the strike. Contrarily, there was an immediate objec-
tion to Huey's use of race-based peremptory challenges. 9 The
significance of this distinction serves only to highlight a trial
court's duty to either refuse to exclude the challenged juror or to
demand a race-neutral reason for the peremptory from the pro-
ponent. The district court in Boyd had no affirmative duty to
request Boyd to explain his peremptory challenge. The district
court in Huey, however, did have such a duty because a party
objected to the challenge."0
Regardless of the weight accorded to the factual dissimilari-
ties between the two cases, the conflict between the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits persists. No matter how one views the cases,
the Fifth Circuit's grant of a new trial to Huey cannot be recon-
ciled with the Seventh Circuit's rejection of Boyd's appeal for a
new trial.
Possible Resolutions of the Conflicting Opinions
After the Seventh Circuit denied his request for a new trial,
Boyd applied for certiorari from the Supreme Court only to be
denied."' If and when the Court decides to resolve the issue of
had based the peremptory on the race of a venireman. See id.
109. See Huey, 76 F.3d at 639-40 (noting that counsel for Garcia objected to each
challenge).
110. This raises the question of whether courts should be permitted to challenge,
sua sponte, a party's peremptory challenge. If an overriding concern behind the
Batson decision is to protect the "integrity of our judicial system," id. at 641, then it
would seem to follow that the court should be able to challenge a party's peremptory
strike as being race- or gender-based. If this were the case, then trial courts do,
indeed, have a difficult task before them. Not only must trial courts separate pretext
from legitimate basis when a party offers a race- or gender-neutral reason for a
strike, but the courts must also be vigilant for unconstitutional peremptory strikes of
which the proponent's adversary is not even aware.
This direct issue has not been placed before the courts. In Dias v. Sky Chefs,
Inc., 948 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit stated that it was not the trial
court's duty to address, sua sponte, a litigant's questionable peremptory challenge.
See id at 535. The court held that if counsel does not ask the court for a Batson
hearing, it is not grounds for reversal that no such hearing occurred. See id.
111. See Boyd v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1825 (1997), denying cert. to 86 F.3d
719 (7th Cir. 1996). Prior to filing for certiorari, Boyd's attorney noted, "I think [the
issue] really is ripe for Supreme Court review. It's an area the Supreme Court has
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whether a defendant may be granted a new trial based upon -his
deliberate exercise of race-based peremptory challenges, prior
precedent suggests the Court will probably side with the Sev-
enth Circuit's reasoning in Boyd. Specifically, the Court will
likely hold that a defendant may not profit from his own deliber-
ate errors despite the uncompensated harm suffered by the
excluded jurors and the judicial system.
Since its decision in Batson eleven years ago, the Court has
altered its primary reasoning behind why race-based peremptory
challenges offend the Constitution. In Batson, the Court gave
three reasons why the state's use of race-based challenges is
unconstitutional."2 First, race-based challenges infringe upon
"a defendant's right to equal protection because [they] den[y]
him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.""'
Second, race-based peremptory challenges violate the equal
protection rights of the excluded jurors." Third and finally,
race-based challenges "touch the entire community" because
they "undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
of justice.""5 Despite the Court's acknowledgment that race-
based strikes harm the excluded jurors and society as a whole,
the emphasis of the Court's opinion was on the equal protection
rights of the black defendant."6
shown an interest in since the Batson case." See Rooney, supra note 7, at 1.
112. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 87 (noting that "by denying a person participation in jury service on
account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminate[s] against the excluded
juror").
115. Id.
116. See generally id. at 86-87 (discussing the equal protection violation). Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, spent only two paragraphs on the effects of race-based
challenges on the excluded jurors, the judicial system, and society as a whole. See
id. at 87-88. He did not explain how a defendant might have standing to bring a
claim on behalf of the excluded jurors, nor did he hypothesize about what would
happen if the defendant were white and complained of race-based peremptory strikes
that excluded black jurors. In such an example, the defendant would not be able to
ground his objection on the fact that his own equal protection rights were violated;
the defendant would have to rely upon the arguments that the excluded jurors and
the judicial system were harmed. Extending Powell's reasoning to that situation, it
would seem that the white defendant should have a valid objection, yet Powell did
not explain how the mechanics of such an objection or appeal might work. Powell
also avoided the thorny issue of third-party standing. It is fair to say that Powell
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In the peremptory challenge cases following Batson, the Court
shifted its emphasis from the equal protection rights of the de-
fendant"7 to the equal protection rights of the excluded ju-
rors18 and to a concern for the judiciary's integrity."9 In
Powers v. Ohio, the Court found itself confronted with a case in
which it could not use the defendant's rights rationale to legiti-
mize its holding.2 ' In declaring that the prosecutor's use of
race-based peremptory challenges unconstitutionally denied the
excluded jurors "a significant opportunity to participate in civic
life," 21 the Court spent considerable energy explaining the
defendant's third-party standing to bring an action based on the
interests of excluded jurors.'22 Although the facts of the case
devoted the msjority of the opinion in Batson to detailing how race-based challenges
offend a defendant's rights, leaving the question of third-party standing to be re-
solved at another time. The Court explicitly addressed that issue in Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400, 410-15 (1991). See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
117. The idea that peremptory challenges infringe upon the equal protection rights
of the criminal defendant "is the oldest and most frequently invoked foundation for a
ban on jury discrimination." Underwood, supra note 3, at 728.
118. See generally Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-09 (discussing the benefits provided to
individuals by jury service and how racial discrimination in choosing jurors unfairly
deprives the excluded individual of those benefits).
119. See generally id. at 411-12 (noting the "cynicism" respecting juries that would
result from permitting race-based challenges).
120. The Court could not justify its holding based on protecting the defendant's
equal protection rights because the defendant was white and the excluded jurors
were black. See id at 402-03. As a result, the Court noted that its Batson decision
served more than one purpose. See id. at 406. Not only did Batson serve "to protect
individual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors," but also, the
decision "recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
harms the excluded jurors and the community at large." Id.
121. Id. at 409.
122. Justice Kennedy committed a significant portion of the Court's opinion to the
subject of third-party standing. Id. at 410-15. In a typical action, a litigant must
claim a violation of his own rights or interests and may not assert those of a third
party. See id. at 410. In certain instances, however, a party may bring a claim on
another's behalf. See id To be able to bring an action based on the interests of a
nonlitigant, three criteria must be met: (1) "[tlhe litigant must have suffered an 'in-
jury in fact"; (2) "the litigant must have a close relation to the third party"; and (3)
"there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her
own interests." Id. at 411. In Powers, the Court held that the criminal defendant
suffered an "injury in fact," not because the excluded black members were more like-
ly to vote for acquittal, but because the race-based peremptory challenges robbed the
defendant of a "vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and
its prosecutors." Id. In short, illicit peremptory challenges injure the defendant by
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may not have allowed the Court to return to its emphasis on the
defendant's rights, the Court seemed entirely willing and com-
fortable in placing the excluded jurors and society's interests
upon center stage.
This evolution of reasoning continued through Edmonson v.
Lee, 2 ' Georgia v. McCollum,'" and J.E.B.'25 as the Court
placed increased emphasis on the rights of the excluded jurors
and the importance of protecting the judiciary. Edmonson had
its foundations in the rights of the excluded jurors and did not
mention the rights of the litigant.'28 McCollum, which held un-
constitutional a defendant's use of race-based peremptory chal-
lenges, could not have been based on the rights of the defen-
dant.'27 Finally, in J.E.B., the Supreme Court had the perfect
opportunity to return to its earlier rationale announced in
leading him to question the fairness and integrity of the judicial system. See id. at
411 ('[Rlacial discrimination in the selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the integrity of
the judicial process' and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt."
(quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 546 (1979) (citation omitted)); see also id. at
411-14 (discussing the importance of fostering the perception of fairness in court in
order to validate the verdict in the eyes of the defendant, the jurors, and their com-
munity).
Justice Scalia subsequently chastised the Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B. for "applying the uniquely expansive third-party standing analysis of Powers v.
Ohio." 511 U.S. 127, 159 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia compared al-
lowing the defendant to bring a claim on the excluded jurors' behalf to "making res-
titution to Paul when it is Peter who has been robbed." Id.
123. 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) ("To permit racial exclusion in [the courthouse] com-
pounds the racial insult inherent in judging a [prospective juror] by the color of his
or her skin.").
124. 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (recognizing the injury suffered by the State 'when the
fairness and integrity of its own judicial process is undermined").
125. 511 U.S. at 140 (arguing that "the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes"
by the use of discriminatory challenges results in "the inevitable loss of confidence
in our judicial system" and "may create the impression that . . . the 'deck has been
stacked' in favor of one side").
126. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619 (recognizing that "discrimination on the basis
of race in selecting a jury in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less
than discrimination in a criminal trial. In either case, race is the sole reason for
denying the excluded venire-person the honor and privilege of participating in our
system of justice") (citation omitted).
127. It was the defendant in McCollum who employed the race-based challenges.
See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 44-45. Determined to find the defendant's challenges un-
constitutional, the Court had no choice but to base its holding on the rights of the
excluded jurors and the integrity of the judicial system. See id. at 48-50.
980
19981 CURRENT STATE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Batson-the defendant's equal protection rights. Both cases
involved peremptory challenges used to exclude jurors sharing a
similar trait with the defendants." Instead, the Court chose
to embrace its more recent holdings. In making only a passing
acknowledgment of the violation to the defendant's equal protec-
tion rights,2 the Court in J.E.B. quickly proceeded to its now
familiar concern with the rights of the excluded jurors. 30 The
Court itself acknowledged that in recent peremptory challenge
cases, it had shifted its focus.
131
This change of focus to the rights of the excluded jurors and
the integrity of the judicial system, will impact the Court if it
takes the opportunity to resolve the issue presented by the split
between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.3 2 The Fifth Circuit in
Huey seemed to pick up where the Supreme Court left off in
J.E.B. When the Fifth Circuit granted Huey a new trial, it held
that critics might see "some irony" in such a decision, but the
court was compelled to undertake its course of action in order
not to "undermine the very foundation of our system of jus-
tice."33 The Fifth Circuit, like the Supreme Court in J.E.B.,
arrived at its decision by considering the welfare of the system
as a whole." The holding, while creating an absurd result in
regard to Huey, arguably produced a desirable result for the
judicial system.
128. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-83 (1986).
Whereas Batson entailed the state striking black veniremen to the detriment of a
black defendant, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83, J.E.B. had the state striking male
veniremen to the alleged disadvantage of the male defendant, see J.E.B., 511 U.S. at
129.
129. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 ("The litigants are harmed by the risk that the
prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire
proceedings.").
130. See id. at 140-42.
131. See id at 140-41 ("In recent cases we have emphasized that individual jurors
themselves have a right to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures.").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
133. United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992)).
134. Compare Huey, 76 F.3d at 641 (noting the Court's concern that discriminatory
jury selection "impugns the integrity of the judicial system and the community at
large") with J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 ("The community is harmed by the . .. inevita-
ble loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in
the courtroom engenders.").
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The Fifth Circuit, perhaps "sacrificing" the conviction in order
to promote the overall integrity of the judicial system, acted in
accordance with one of the basic tenets of criminal proce-
dure-deterring future constitutional violations by setting an
example."3 5 Desiring to prevent such race-based challenges in
the future, the court set an example by granting Huey a new trial
and by admonishing trial judges to be on their toes for unconsti-
tutional Batson challenges.' "[W]e believe.., such mischief
can be avoided with relative ease by the exercise of diligent over-
sight and sound judgment on the part of trial judges, and through
their proper application of the well-known three-step inquiry for
ensuring race-neutral use of peremptory challenges.""'
The Fifth Circuit was undoubtedly correct in stating that the
excluded black jurors suffered a harm. In its attempt to prevent
similar harms to prospective future veniremen, however, the
court chose to ignore a fundamental aspect of trial procedure: A
party cannot cry foul based upon its own deliberate error.3 s As
135. Criminal procedure is replete with examples of foregoing the conviction of a
particular defendant for the loftier goal of deterring future violations of people's con-
stitutional rights. For example, the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment dis-
allows the use of any evidence seized by the government in violation of a
defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The purpose of the exclusionary
rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effec-
tively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Through another rule of exclusion, the Supreme
Court protects a different cornerstone of criminal procedure: the right of a defendant
to be free from compelled self-incrimination. The Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), held that a prosecutor may not use statements made by a defen-
dant during custodial interrogation unless the defendant has been apprised of his
rights. See id. at 444. The Miranda decision protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment
right while also deterring police officers from pursuing confessions through trickery,
threats, or a defendant's ignorance of his rights. See id. at 476.
136. See Huey, 76 F.3d at 641-42.
137. Id. at 642. In the event that no litigant objects to a possibly discriminatory
peremptory challenge, a subsequent appeal based on the alleged Batson violation will
fail. See Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 948 F.2d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 1991). A Batson objec-
tion must be timely. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir.
1987). The opponent of the peremptory should object "as soon as possible, preferably
before the jury is sworn." Dias, 948 F.2d at 534.
138. See generally United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1825 (1997) ("[T]he principle that no one is entitled to profit from
his own wrong governs the content of trials as well as the imposition of criminal
sanctions."). The Seventh Circuit found this point to be one that could not be log-
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much as a court may wish to curtail future Batson violations, it
may not take a prophylactic measure such as granting a defen-
dant a new trial if by doing so, the court abandons a basic proce-
dural foundation. Recognizing the Fifth Circuit's desire to pre-
vent later Batson abuses, the Seventh Circuit noted the impossi-
bility of such a goal under current trial principles:
If a decision of the Supreme Court gave the accused the right
to bootstrap his own violation of Batson into a new trial, we
would be obliged to enforce that holding. But there is no such
decision, and the principle that no one is entitled to profit
from his own wrong governs the conduct of trials as well as
the imposition of criminal sanctions." 9
If other cases presenting the same issue find their way to the
Supreme Court, the Court will undoubtedly side with the Sev-
enth Circuit's position. Despite the Court's increasing willing-
ness to decide peremptory challenge cases based upon the ex-
cluded jurors' rights and the integrity of the judicial system, the
Court will not be able to overcome the unavoidable obstacle pre-
sented by a defendant who seeks to profit from his own error.
This one principle of error blocks the evolving nature of the pe-
remptory, and the Court may thus find one direction in which it
will be prevented from expanding the reach of the peremptory.
The Continuing Confusion Underlying the Circuit Split
Regardless of any future resolution of the narrow issue identi-
fied in Huey and Boyd, the ongoing confusion created by the
shifting foundation of the peremptory challenge is sure to cause
similar conflicts among other courts in the coming years. Not
only must courts interpret the recent trend of the Supreme
Court to focus more on the harms felt by excluded jurors and the
judicial system than on the rights of the defendant,4 ' but also,
courts must wade through case law containing "judicial interpre-
ically overcome. See id at 721-22.
139. Id. at 725.
140. See David Zonana, The Effect of Assumptions About Racial Bias on the Anal-
ysis of Batson's Three Harms and the Peremptory Challenge, 1994 ANN. SURv. AM. L.
203, 204.
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tations of Batson [that] are all over the map."'
The confusion surrounding the peremptory challenge also re-
quires judges to continuously ponder whether the basis of the
challenge should or will be extended to prohibit challenges based
on considerations typically afforded heightened scrutiny.'
Furthermore, trial courts must practice "diligent oversight and
sound judgment" to prevent litigants from employing the pre-
emptory challenge to create "mischief' as witnessed in Huey.'
Trial courts must also listen to litigants' proffered race- and gen-
der-neutral reasons for their peremptory challenges and then
separate the valid reasons from the purely pretextual. Finally,
the courts must keep some record of the race, gender, and other
characteristics of excluded jurors who might later be the subject
of a Batson hearing.
The burden and confusion created by Batson and its offspring
have caused a judicial nightmare. The Supreme Court once
again needs to enter the fray and finally give direction to the
shifting peremptory challenge.
POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR THE EVOLVING PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE
The peremptory challenge has eroded significantly-from an
unassailable defense against biased jurors to one subject to nu-
merous equal-protection attacks.'" The turmoil, litigation, and
confusion created by Batson challenges makes predicting the
future of this litigant's tool difficult.45 It is, however, possible
141. Minetos v. City Univ. of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
142. See David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitutional Con-
straints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997) (noting certain courts'
decisions to prohibit peremptory challenges based on religion, disability, or national
origin). See generally David G. Hart & Russell D. Cawyer, Batson and its Progeny
Prohibit the Use of Peremptory Challenges Based Upon Disability and Religion: A
Practitioner's Guide for Requesting a Civil Batson Hearing, 26 TEx. TECH. L. REV.
109, 113-18 (1995) (stating that challenges based on disability or religious affiliation
are impermissible).
143. United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6. The Batson decision in 1986 marked
the beginning of tremendous change for the peremptory challenge as it "substantially
limited an attorney's use of the peremptory challenge for the first time." See Collins,
supra note 68, at 947.
145. See GARCIA, supra note 6, at 200 (recognizing that "the Court's jurisprudence
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to outline four possible directions for the peremptory. First, the
court may find comfort in the status quo and continue to rule
that race- and gender-based peremptory challenges are unconsti-
tutional. 46 Under this approach, the Court eventually might
extend its Batson holding to include not only race and gender,
but also religion, age, disability, and other discriminatorily ex-
cluded groups. Second, the Court might abolish the peremptory
challenge altogether.'47 Third, the Court might choose to main-
tain the current system while relaxing the requirement on lower
courts to screen thoroughly peremptory challenges.' The
Court could favor form over substance and claim to strike down
all race- and gender-based challenges when, in fact, it would be
allowing litigants to camouflage illegitimate challenges in pre-
text. Finally, the Court could turn back the clock eleven years
and reinstate peremptory challenges that cannot be questioned
and do not need to be explained. 49
Maintaining the Status Quo
The first and most likely course for the Court to pursue is to
continue to enforce its Batson decision to the extent that it ap-
plies to race and gender, 50 prosecutor and criminal defen-
dant, 5 ' and plaintiff and civil defendant.'52 To continue on
its current path, the Court would emphasize its belief that race-
and gender-based challenges hurt more than just the opposing
party.'53 The Court now recognizes that appearances are often
as important as substance; how litigants, bystanders, and jurors
view the judicial system is of the utmost concern."5
has not been a model of consistency and rationality").
146. See infra text accompanying notes 150-70.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 171-205.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 206-15.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 216-32.
150. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
151. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
152. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
153. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986).
154. See Underwood, supra note 3, at 727. Professor Underwood, in noting how
important the jury system is in the United States, compared the injuries suffered by
excluded jurors to the harm done to our democratic ideals when groups of voters are
disenfranchised. See id. Even though the outcome of an election or a verdict may
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The trend of the Court to focus less on the individual litigants'
rights and more on the excluded jurors' rights, and on the judi-
cial system's projection of fairness, leads some scholars to be-
lieve that the Court should extend Batson to protect other dis-
criminated groups.'55 It would seem that the Court could ex-
tend Batson to protect any discriminatorily excluded jurors who
belong to groups previously afforded heightened scrutiny by the
Court.' By preventing peremptory strikes that discriminate
against certain other groups, the Court would create a better
cross-section of the community on jury panels."5 7 Defendants
judged by juries composed of a greater percentage of their peers
would have more confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
system. 15
not necessarily differ when certain citizens are not allowed to participate, the mere
act of excluding those people "impairs public confidence." Id. Professor Underwood
believes that it is the "derivative harms" that arise from unconstitutional challenges
that "reinforce our shared commitment to eradicate such discrimination." Id.
155. See, e.g., Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting
Peremptory Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association
Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 602-03 (1996) (stating the need to expand Batson
to protect veniremen from being peremptorily challenged based on their associations
with certain groups and causes and their practice of free speech); Frederick L.
Brown et aL, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials:
Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 192, 234 (1978) (citing the advan-
tages of protecting jurors excluded because of race, age, sex, and ethnicity); Andrew
Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury Service for People with Dis-
abilities, 33 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1997) (arguing for the expansion of
Batson to encompass veniremen with disabilities); Collins, supra note 68, at 974-76
(predicting that religious affiliation and illegitimacy will be the next grounds upon
which the Court extends Batson).
In dissenting to the Court's decision in J.E.B., Justice Scalia predicted that the
Court would not stop with declaring race- and gender-based challenges to be uncon-
stitutional. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 160-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court had the
opportunity to review a case that extended Batson to include strikes based upon
religious affiliation, but it declined to do so. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767
(Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994).
156. See Collins, supra note 68, at 974. In his dissent from the Court's denial of
certiorari in Davis, Justice Thomas commented that "given the Court's rationale in
J.E.B., no principled reason immediately appears for declining to apply Batson to
any strike based on a classification that is accorded heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause." Davis, 511 U.S. at 1117 (Thomas, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (involving peremptory strikes based upon reli-
gious-affiliation).
157. See Brown et al., supra note 155, at 234.
158. In J.E.B., Justice Scalia commented on the importance of the appearance or
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But extension of the Batson holding will only exacerbate prob-
lems already present with peremptory challenges. It may be that
any further extension of Batson comes at a time when the pe-
remptory challenge is already dead.'59 By carving away at the
peremptory challenge until opposing counsel may at any time
elect to question its use, the Court has molded the challenge into
something more resembling the for cause challenge.60
Other problems accompanying the extension of Batson to in-
clude religion-based 6' or other attacks include longer trials,
more confusing and unwieldy Batson appeals, and an increased
inability of litigants to act on hunches concerning a venireman's
bias. "'62 Trials would be longer because voir dire would have to
be extended for the parties to better inform themselves about
the members of the venire in case of a later Batson challenge
requiring an explanation. 6 ' Batson "mini-hearings"' are al-
ready too common 65 and time consuming, and any extension of
the restrictions on the peremptory challenge will "increase[] the
projection of fairness in the judicial system. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 n.3 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote that "[w]ise observers have long understood that
the appearance of justice is as important as its reality. If the system of peremptory
strikes affects the actual impartiality of the jury not a bit, but gives litigants a
greater belief in that impartiality, it serves a most important function." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also, Gerard N. Magliocca, Case Note, Arbitrary Rationality, 106 YALE L.J.
1959, 1964 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of litigants' perceptions of the composition of
the jury).
159. See Ferdico, supra note 37, at 1202, 1207.
160. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that in extend-
ing Batson to gender-based challenges, the Court will "make the peremptory chal-
lenge less discretionary and more like a challenge for cause").
161. For a discussion concerning religion-based Batson challenges, see Barton, supra
note 68 (arguing in favor of the extension of Batson to include religion-based chal-
lenges).
162. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
163. See generally JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VoiR DIRE AND JURY SELEC-
TION: GAINING AN EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING A JURY 176 (1995) (stating
that "it is important to maximize the information gained through voir dire' and
suggesting ways to elicit the most information from perspective jurors).
164. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 175-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the confusion existing in the lower
courts as a result of the lack of clarity in the standards for exercising peremptory challenges
following Batson and J.E.B.). See generally FREDERIC, supra note 163, at 173 ("Peremptory
challenges have been under increased scrutiny since Batson v. Kentucky.").
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number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will
become part of the main event."66
Under the current jury selection system, the trial judge car-
ries a significant burden because he must separate legitimate
peremptory challenges from objectionable discriminatory
ones.167 Sorting pretext from true showings of bias on an ad
hoc basis leaves the trial judge with much discretion;68 it also
forces the judge to be constantly aware of discriminatory uses of
the peremptory. Chief Justice Burger wrote in his dissent in
Batson that the Batson inquiry "is sure to tax even the most
capable of counsel and judges since determining whether a pri-
ma facie case has been established will 'require a continued
monitoring and recording of the.., composition of the panel
present and prospective." 69
166. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. See Christopher E. Smith & Roxanne Ochoa, The Peremptory Challenge in the
Eyes of the Trial Judge, 79 JUDICATURE 185, 185 (1996) (recognizing the "significant
difficulties" a trial judge faces when separating pretext from actual race- and gender-
based challenges).
168. A trial judge's decision in the third step of the Batson inquiry "is accorded
great deference, and is reviewed under a 'clearly erroneous' standard." United States
v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1109 (5th Cir. 1993).
169. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 130 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 294 (1978)). Justice Marshall also predicted the
terrible burden that trial judges would be forced to carry in assessing the explana-
tions given by the striking party. See id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). The diffi-
culty faced by the trial judge is only matched by the ease with which counsel can
offer neutral explanations as to why he challenged a particular juror. See Michael J.
Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under
Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 236-37 (1993). Raphael and
Ungvarsky wrote of their research results and described the possible scenarios in-
volving a hypothetical black juror named "Pat":
In virtually any situation, an intelligent prosecutor can produce a
plausible neutral explanation for striking Pat despite the prosecutor's
having acted on racial bias. The prosecutor can show either that Pat has
served on a jury before, or that Pat has never served on a jury before.
The prosecutor can explain that Pat is young or that Pat is old. He can
say that he does not want a juror with Pat's occupation for this case, or
that Pat is unemployed . . . . The prosecutor can even focus on a ran-
dom aspect of the juror's character or past dealings, even if it only re-
motely relates to some aspect of the case or to the legal process in gen-
eral . . . . Consequently, given the current case law, a prosecutor who
wishes to offer a pretext for a race-based strike is unlikely to encounter
difficulty in crafting a neutral explanation.
Id. at 237.
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Despite the obvious difficulties inherent in the current pe-
remptory challenge system, the Supreme Court will, in all prob-
ability, continue to enforce its Batson decision. The Court is also
likely to broaden the scope of Batson to include categories pro-
tected in other circumstances by heightened scrutiny. The
Court's jurisprudence is sure to cause nightmares for attorneys,
judges, and parties as they demand explanations for those chal-
lenges that, by definition, are beyond explanation. 7 '
Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge
A second direction in which the Court could travel would be to
abolish the peremptory challenge. At least three distinct argu-
ments exist for this seemingly drastic action.' First, many be-
lieve the peremptory challenge currently exists in name
only.' Second, some commentators contend that the peremp-
tory challenge, although once a necessary institution, no longer
serves a useful purpose.' Third and finally, some believe that
the peremptory, by its very nature, is an undemocratic and pur-
posefully discriminatory tool that serves only the objectionable
goal of excluding citizens from exercising their fundamental
170. See VAN DYKE, supra note 24, at 145. Justice O'Connor recognized that de-
manding race- and gender-neutral explanations for peremptory challenges flies in the
face of the original use and understanding of the peremptory challenges. She has
argued that as the Court piles "layer by layer, additional constitutional restraints on
the use of the peremptory, [the Court] force[s] lawyers to articulate what [it] know[s]
is often inarticulable." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. A fourth, less contentious, objection to the peremptory, challenge is that it is
simply ineffective. Several studies show that lawyers exercising their peremptory
challenges often are poor judges of how the individual jurors will vote. See, e.g.,
Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with
Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 726
(1991); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges
on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV.
491, 528-30 (1978). The reasons why attorneys are so ineffective in predicting jurors'
voting patterns may be that voir dire is too brief to gather necessary information
and the attorneys never receive any feedback as to how their predictions panned
out. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 76.
172. See, e.g., Lisa Lee Mancini Harden, Recent Case, The End of the Peremptory
Challenge? The Implications of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B. for Jury Selection in
Alabama, 47 ALA. L. REV. 243, 261 (1995).
173. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 502 (1996).
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right of jury duty.174
The definition of a peremptory challenge is "[t]he right to
challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign,
a reason for the challenge." 175 As currently limited by Batson,
the peremptory challenge no longer exists. Of course, the vast
majority of peremptory challenges that parties exercise do not
require an explanation because the other party does not object
or, if it does object, it fails to make a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Nonetheless, the possibility always remains that an
objection to the peremptory challenge will require an explana-
tion when, by definition, none can be required. 17
The second argument supporting the retirement of the pe-
remptory challenge draws support from the highly evolved na-
ture of the for cause challenge and from the perceived harms
and confusion caused by the current form of the peremptory
challenge. 7 7 Proponents of this argument cite all of the evils
recognized by other detractors of the peremptory challenge. 7 8
174. The Court long ago noted that the peremptory challenge holds a power of ex-
clusion and not of inclusion. The peremptory "is not of itself a right to select, but a
right to reject jurors." United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 482
(1827).
175. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
176. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger stated:
Our system permits two types of challenges: challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges. Challenges for cause obviously have to be ex-
plained; by definition, peremptory challenges do not. "It is called a pe-
remptory challenge because the prisoner may challenge peremptorily, on
his own dislike without showing any cause." Analytically, there is no
middle ground: A challenge either has to be explained or it does not. It
is readily apparent, then, that to permit inquiry into the basis for a pe-
remptory challenge would force "the peremptory challenge [to] collapse
into the challenge for cause."
Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
177. See generally Melilli, supra note 173, at 501 ("The costs in terms of the rights
of potential jurors and the loss of representative juries is significant .... [Any
'gain' in terms of the litigants' private interests in gaining more favorable factfinders
simply deserves no consideration.").
178. See id.
[Tihe exclusion from jury service because of group stereotyping brands
the excluded group members as inferior, insults individuals by reducing
their worth as jurors to a cosmetic or trivial characteristic, makes
underrepresented groups less accepting of the court system and its re-
sults, and injures society as a whole by frustrating the ideal of equal
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With the modern requirement that jury pools represent a fair
cross-section of society and the ability of litigants to employ for
cause challenges to remove veniremen who appear biased during
voir dire, the once indispensable peremptory challenge might be
an outdated relic.'79
Finally, many argue against the peremptory challenge be-
cause it allows counsel to exclude qualified jurors for illegiti-
mate reasons. In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice
Marshall stated that "[tlhe inherent potential of peremptory
challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclu-
sion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court
to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system."8 °
Justice Marshall found the three-part Batson test to be inade-
quate protection against race-based peremptory challenges.'8 '
According to critics such as Justice Marshall, it is too easy for
a party to camouflage a discriminatory basis for a peremptory
strike in pretextual explanations.'82
Critics state that the peremptory challenge is the "most un-
democratic feature of our democratic trial system." " The pe-
citizen participation in the jury process.
Id.
179. See Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution,
6 LOY. LA L. REV. 247, 269 (1973).
180. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
181. Justice Marshall noted two distinct reasons why the Batson test would not be
sufficient. First, defendants often cannot satisfy the first step of the inquiry, showing
a prima facie case of discrimination, unless the race-based challenges are glaringly
obvious. See id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring). If, for instance, a few black men
remained on the jury, but many others had been struck through allegedly discrimi-
natory peremptory challenges, the defendant might not be able to show a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination as to the excluded jurors. Second, even if the defendant
manages to show a prima facie case of discrimination, the trial judge may have tre-
mendous difficulty sorting the illegitimate motives from the legitimate ones. See id.
at 105-06 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall later seemed to modify his
stance on peremptory challenges in Holland v. United States, 493 U.S. 474 (1990),
by asserting that prohibiting peremptory challenges that "exclude members of dis-
tinctive groups on the basis of their 'distinctive' attribute would leave the pe-
remptory challenge system almost entirely untouched." Id. at 502 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
182. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-06 (Marshall, J., concurring); GARCIA, supra note
6, at 195.
183. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 156 (1989).
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remptory challenge permits parties to strike qualified potential
jurors who have shown no evidence of being impartial or biased
towards one of the parties." By allowing counsel to strike per-
fectly able jurors, the peremptory challenge harms excluded ju-
rors and lowers their respect and confidence in the judicial sys-
tem.'85 The fact that the peremptory challenge occurs in the
courtroom and under the approving eye of the trial judge is
ironic."6 It is all the more ironic when one considers that the
allegedly undemocratic peremptory challenge is a tool used to
help form a trial jury, which "is universally understood as an
important institution of democratic government." 8"
A federal district court recently issued a strongly worded
opinion calling for a complete ban on the use of peremptory
challenges.'88 The court stated that "peremptory challenges per
se violate equal protection."'89 While presiding over an employ-
ment discrimination case in which both the plaintiff and defen-
dant alleged Batson violations by the other party, the exasperat-
ed trial judge noted that having for cause challenges should be
sufficient and peremptory challenges should be abolished.'
184. See GARCIA, supra note 6, at 192; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 72.
185. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (noting the
"inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimina-
tion in the courtroom engenders").
186. In its discussion of how a private litigant's use of a race-based peremptory
challenge offends the Constitution, the Court in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
took considerable pains to describe the sanctity of the courtroom. "Few places are a
more real expression of the constitutional authority of the government than a
courtroom, where the law itself unfolds. Within the courtroom, the government in-
vokes its laws to determine the rights of those who stand before it." Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). If one agrees that peremptory chal-
lenges are, per se, undemocratic and discriminatory, then the fact that litigants ex-
ercise the strikes with the blessing of the trial courts should offend all sensibilities.
187. Underwood, supra note 3, at 727. The Supreme Court in Powers v. Ohio stat-
ed that "[Wury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the
rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the peo-
ple." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991); see also, Brown et al., supra note
155, at 192.
188. See Minetos v. City Univ. of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
189. Id. at 185.
190. See id. at 182.
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The mechanics of abandoning the peremptory challenge do not
pose much of an obstacle. Despite the long history and continued
use of the peremptory challenge, it has no constitutional ba-
sis.' 9' A litigant has no absolute right to exercise peremptory
challenges. 9 Not only do critics of the peremptory point to its
lack of constitutional authority, but also, they claim that, despite
its widespread use, the peremptory challenge has little practical
use as it fails to accomplish its stated goal of selecting an impar-
tial jury.3 Despite the noble underlying rationale of selecting
an impartial jury, in reality, litigants "do not desire impartiality
but rather favorability."'94 Counsel for the parties expend con-
siderable energy and resources trying to "pick" the members of
the venire who will be the most favorable to their cause. 9 5 The
exercise of peremptory challenges thus involves manipulative and
deceptive tactics by attorneys under the guise of impartiality.'
Proponents of the peremptory challenge admit that such abus-
es exist; however, they also point out that the peremptory chal-
lenge still serves a legitimate role.' 97 No matter what abuses
occur, the challenge, like the challenge for cause, acts as a safe-
191. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1991) ("There is nothing in
the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremp-
tory challenges to defendants in criminal cases .... ").
192. See United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1825 (1997). Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that a litigant or,
more specifically, a criminal defendant has a right to peremptorily challenge prospec-
tive jurors. Peremptory challenges are provided for by statute. See FREDERICK, supra
note 163, at 173; GARCIA, supra note 6, at 196.
193. It is widely accepted that the primary reason for the peremptory challenge is
to seat an impartial jury. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8 ("M[The only legitimate
interest [that one] could possibly have in the exercise of [one's] peremptory challeng-
es is securing a fair and impartial jury."); Kerr et al., supra note 171, at 681.
194. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 74.
195. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE
THE JUROR 42, 44 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
196. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 74. Critics find that the peremptory's
tactical and strategic role in the litigants trial plan offends the reason for the
peremptory's existence. See generally Brown et al., supra note 155, at 223-28 (de-
scribing the reasons attorneys make peremptory challenges and the problems under-
lying the assumptions those attorneys make concerning jury preferences).
197. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147-48 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Barbara L.
Horwitz, Comment, The Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will the Jury
System Lose by Its Demise?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1391, 1439-40 (1993) ("Yet, the peremp-
tory is as important today as ever in achieving what it was designed to accomplish.").
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guard to litigants, all of whom deserve a fair trial.'9 8 Further-
more, even if the peremptory strikes overwhelmingly serve to
strike unfavorable, as opposed to impartial, veniremen, they still
present the appearance of impartiality and fairness, which may
be just as important as actual impartiality.'99 Attorneys, who
are expected to be zealous advocates for their clients, have a
duty to exclude jurors who they feel will not be favorably predis-
posed to their clients.00  The ultimate response to the
abolitionists' argument against the peremptory challenge is that
the peremptory challenge is a tool of exclusion, not inclusion.
The peremptory does not give the parties an opportunity to
choose a jury of their liking;20 ' it only permits the parties to
exclude possibly impartial jurors.
The abolition of the peremptory challenge is unlikely to occur
as the Court, despite its narrowing of the challenge, continuous-
ly affirms its belief that the peremptory "occupies an important
position in... trial procedures."2 2 Only Justice Marshall has
198. Opponents may object to the fact that some attorneys use their peremptory
challenges to select potentially favorable jurors. Besides the fact that peremptory
challenges do not allow counsel to select jurors but only to reject jurors, the use of
the peremptory to somehow create a favorable jury is not altogether misguided. It
may be that a completely impartial jury does not exist. See United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 49, 50-51 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692f) ("Were it possible to obtain a
jury without any prepossessions whatever respecting the guilt or innocence of the
accused, it would be extremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps
impossible, and therefore will not be required."). When faced with an impartial veni-
re, surely a litigant cannot be faulted for striking those whom he views as unsympa-
thetic in order to create a favorably disposed jury.
199. See supra note 158 (discussing the importance of public perception to the judi-
cial process).
200. See HANS & VEDMAR, supra note 1, at 74.
201. See United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 482 (1827) ("The
right, therefore, of challenge, does not necessarily draw after it the right of selection,
but merely of exclusion.").
202. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). Not only has the Supreme Court
confessed its belief in the utility of the peremptory challenge, but also, trial judges
continue to support the peremptory challenge. See Smith & Ochoa, supra note 167,
at 185. A recent survey of federal district court judges concluded that "the prospects
for reform of the peremptory challenge are dim." Id. at 189. Only 15.4% of the re-
sponding judges called for the removal of all peremptory challenges. See id. at 188,
tbl. 3. Nearly two-thirds of the judges replied that they would keep the current sys-
tem if it were their decision. See id Smith and Ochoa concluded that the survey's
results showed "strong levels of support for and acceptance of most aspects of cur-
rent peremptory challenge practices in the federal trial courts." Id. at 189.
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openly called for the death of the peremptory challenge.0 3 In
the Court's opinions narrowing the effective reach of the pe-
remptory, the Court has taken great pains to note that its deci-
sions will not cause the peremptory to fade into oblivion.'0 4 It
is clear that the Court is not ready to cast out the peremptory
challenge; whether the Court emasculates the peremptory to the
point of ineffectiveness is another issue.2" 5
Allowing Shallow Explanations
The third manner in which the Court could approach the
peremptory challenge in the coming years consists of allowing
litigants to use ostensibly race- and gender-based challenges as
long as the challenges appear neutral. In fact, the Court recently
gave life to this simple idea in Purkett v. Elem."'6 In Purkett,
the Court denied a black criminal defendant's Batson claim after
the prosecution used two peremptory challenges to strike both
black male jurors from the jury pool.207 The prosecutor ex-
plained his challenges by pointing to the two black jurors' long
hair and goatees.0 ' The Court held that a litigant's explana-
tion of his peremptory does not have to be "persuasive, or even
plausible."2 9
203. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (calling for elimination
of peremptory challenges in criminal cases).
204. In Batson, the Court commented, "[W]e do not agree that our decision today
will undermine the contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration
of justice." Id. at 98-99. The Court in Powers v. Ohio affirmed what it made clear in
Holland, "the peremptory challenge procedure has acceptance in our legal tradition."
499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (citing Holland v. United States, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990)).
Later, in Georgia v. McCollum, the Court echoed its statement in Batson as it de-
clared, "We do not believe that this decision will undermine the contribution of the
peremptory challenge to the administration of justice." 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992). Most
recently, the Court explained, "Our conclusion that litigants may not strike potential
jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory
challenges." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
205. See generally Collins, supra note 68 (noting that the Supreme Court may con-
tinue to extend the situations in which peremptory challenges are prohibited);
Ferdico, supra note 37 (acknowledging the Supreme Court's tendency to restrict the
kinds of situations in which peremptory challenges can be used).
206. 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam).
207. See id. at 766.
208. See id. The prosecutor told the trial court that he "[didn't] like the way they
looked, with the way the hair is cut." Id.
209. Id. at 768. The Court stated that the "legitimate reason" required by the pro-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:961
It is unclear as to what the significance of the Purkett decision
will be.210 It is, however, possible that the decision represents
an attempt by the Court to retreat from its post-Batson jurispru-
dence." Instead of taking the equal protection argument re-
garding peremptory challenges to its logical conclusion," 2 the
Court may settle for the less controversial and more discrete
method of turning a blind eye towards certain illicit challenges.
The Court may decide that the best way to handle the ever-ex-
panding equal protection analysis for peremptory challenges is
to allow litigants to explain their challenges based on superfi-
cial, even ridiculous, reasons.1 If the Court does allow shallow
explanations for arguably discriminatory peremptory challenges,
then "only a very stupid [litigant] will ever again lose a Batson
claim. "214
ponent of the peremptory does not need to make sense; it just cannot deny equal
protection. See id. at 769.
210. See Richard C. Reuben, Excuses, Excuses: Any Old Facially Neutral Reason
May Be Enough to Defeat an Attack on a Peremptory Challenge, A.BA J., Feb.
1996, at 20. Reuben spotlighted the widely divergent opinions of many practitioners
as to the ultimate impact of Purkett. See id. Opinions concerning the decision vary
from a belief that Purkett "rips the heart out of Batson v. Kentucky" to a belief that
Purkett "only restates existing law." Id. Reuben concluded that legal scholars agree
Purkett will, at a minimum, alter the way in which attorneys approach Batson hear-
ings. Because they know appellate courts will not second-guess trial judges' Batson
decisions, attorneys will now be forced to focus all of their efforts on the trial court
level. See id. The court in Minetos v. City Univ. of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), predicted Purkett would "add more years of vexatious litigation." Id.
at 183.
211. See Joan E. Imbriani, Survey, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 911, 916 (1996).
212. The logical conclusion for the Court to reach in the wake of Batson would be
to apply equal protection scrutiny to all peremptory challenges leveled against
groups deserving heightened scrutiny. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1116-
17 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993).
The Court in Davis refused to review a case in which a prosecutor peremptorily ex-
cluded a Jehovah's Witness under the belief that such a juror would be loath to con-
vict criminal defendants. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768. Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, wrote in dissent that "given the Court's rationale in J.E.B., no princi-
pled reason immediately appears for declining to apply Batson to any strike based
on a classification that is accorded heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause." Davis, 511 U.S. at 1117 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Purkett, noted that the prosecutor's explanation
'may well be pretextual as a matter of law." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 777 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
214. Donald A. Dripps, ' Didn't Like the Way He Looked, TRIAL, July 1995, at 94,
96; see also Greg B. Enos, Discriminatory Peremptory Jury Strikes in Civil Trials, 58
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Despite the Court's recent holding in Purkett, it seems unlike-
ly that the Court will continue to favor form over substance by
allowing pretextual explanations to Batson challenges. Allowing
such explanations is incompatible with the Court's prior hold-
ings."' Because Batson and J.E.B. specifically disallow race-
and gender-based challenges, allowing such challenges when
explained by pretext would certainly offend the principles laid
down in these prior cases.
Restoring the Pre-Batson Approach
The fourth and final approach the Court may choose to take
when confronted with the problematic peremptory challenge en-
tails returning the challenge to its pre-Batson form. By revisit-
ing its jurisprudence prior to 1986, the Court would restore the
logic216 and usefulness to the challenge while relieving judges
and litigants of the burden of trying to interpret, practice, and
enforce the "ambiguous, confused jurisprudence [of] the Supreme
Court."
217
THE ORIGINAL AND BEST APPROACH TO PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
The first reason for returning the peremptory to its pre-
Batson state is merely an issue of semantics and logic. It is in-
correct and misleading to call the challenge that currently exists
a "peremptory challenge."218 A challenge subject to questioning
TEx. B.J. 228, 232 (1995) (surmising that "if such explanations can survive judicial
scrutiny, then an intelligent attorney can defeat a Batson challenge by dreaming up
any excuse that is not based on racial, religious, or other prohibited modes of dis-
crimination"). One study of hundreds of lower court cases in the five years following
Batson revealed that judges ruled only a small fraction of prosecutors' neutral expla-
nations to be insufficient and invalid. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 169, at
235 (noting that "[a] prosecutor who wishes to rebut the prima facie case does not
face a significant challenge").
215. See generally Imbriani, supra note 211, at 916 (noting that the standard set
by the Court in Purkett "has the potential to foster unjust practices and results in
the selection of jurors").
216. Once again, the peremptory could be a challenge "without a reason stated,
without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
217. GARCIA, supra note 6, at 200.
218. See Dripps, supra note 214, at 94 (noting that constitutionally challenging the
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and explanation is, by definition, not peremptory.21 9
The second reason for returning the peremptory challenge to
its prior form lies in the usefulness of the challenge as a safe-
guard when a challenge for cause does not succeed. A party who
attempts to excuse a juror for cause but fails for lack of proof
should be able to exclude the juror peremptorily; otherwise, that
juror might be biased due to the party's unsuccessful strike.2
This may be especially true in those jurisdictions that force the
parties to exercise their for cause strikes in the company of the
venire."2
A third reason supporting the return of the peremptory chal-
lenge to its pre-Batson form is the role the peremptory challenge
has in boosting the litigants' and the public's confidence in the
jury system. Blackstone understood that by permitting a defen-
dant to act upon his inexplicable gut instinct in excluding seem-
ingly biased veniremen, the defendant would be more likely to
accept the verdict."22 The peremptory challenge gives the par-
ties some sense of control over who will judge them.2" The
peremptory is "something of a contradiction").
219. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(comparing challenges for cause with peremptory challenges).
220. Blackstone long ago offered this reason for why the peremptory challenge is
necessary: "[Ulpon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient
to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes
provoke a resentment; to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is still
at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside." Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (quoting 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353).
221. See generally FREDERICK, supra note 163, at 173 (noting the danger of
alienating "a potential juror whom you cannot remove with a peremptory challenge
if the court rejects the motion for a challenge for cause").
222. Blackstone noted:
As every one must be sensible, what sudden impressions and unaccount-
able prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures
of another; and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend
his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might
totally disconcert him; the law wills not that he should be tried by any
one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice even without being
able to assign a reason for such his dislike.
Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLAcKSToNE, COMMENTARIES *353).
223. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 72; see also Comment, The Right of Pe-
remptory Challenge, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 762 (1957) (noting that peremptory
challenges prevent litigants from feeling that the composition of the jury is complete-
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Court's concern over the possibility that excluded jurors Will feel
alienated and lose confidence in the judiciary pales beside the
need to have litigants, particularly criminal defendants, feel as
though they have been judged fairly.'
A fourth rationale behind purging the peremptory challenge of
all of its current restrictions lies in the fact that all prospective
jurors, regardless of race, gender, or ethnicity, are equally sub-
ject to be excluded by a peremptory challenge.2" This type of
discrimination is different from the type that excludes jurors
from being accepted as a part of the venire.22 Whereas whole-
sale discrimination against any group offends the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, individualized peremptory strikes exercised by liti-
gants do not rise to the level of implying that a particular group
or race is unfit for jury duty.'? Protecting certain groups of
people from being excluded by a peremptory when every other
group is exposed to the possibility of exclusion is discriminatory
in itself.'
By returning the peremptory challenge to its natural and logi-
cal state, the Court will be able to avoid wandering through the
ly in the'hands of the judge).
224. Justice Thomas warned about the implications of restricting a criminal
defendant's peremptory challenge. By placing the excluded jurors' rights in front of
the defendant's rights, the Court "produces a serious misordering of [its] priorities."
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 41, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thom-
as claimed that the handicapped peremptory would leave the defendant with less
protection than before. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
225. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[Tihere is simply nothing 'unequal' about the State's using its peremptory challenges
to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as such
challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants ...
226. See i& at 122-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
227. See id (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Taking this argument one step further, one
might ask why it is incorrect to surmise that jurors of different ages, sexes, races,
religions, or financial status might think or react differently when confronted by
identical facts. See George P. Fletcher, Political Correctness in Jury Selection, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995). Professor Fletcher argued that we cannot ignore
the cultural differences that may affect potential jurors' insights and judgments. See
id. Instead of turning a blind eye towards these cultural differences, Professor
Fletcher encourages the acknowledgement of these differences by permitting litigants
to strike whomever they desire and allowing the litigants' views to offset one an-
other. See id
228. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 423-24 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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labyrinthine complexities of third-party standing. 9 Ridding
the peremptory of its current restrictions would also alleviate
the problems trial judges face in sorting pretext from gender-
and race-neutral explanations for challenged strikes." There
would be fewer appeals based upon discriminatory strikes be-
cause the litigant would have to demonstrate the dis-
criminatory nature of the strike using a provable history of
discrimination."
Despite the stability that would accompany the return of the
pre-Batson peremptory challenge, the Court is unlikely to pro-
ceed in such a direction. 2 Unshackling the peremptory chal-
lenge from its current restrictions would require the Court to
overturn Batson and its offspring.
CONCLUSION
In narrowing the scope of the peremptory challenge, the Su-
preme Court all but destroyed "an important litigator's tool and
a fundamental part of the process of selecting impartial ju-
ries.""' Through a series of cases beginning with Batson, the
Court chipped away at the peremptory challenge to sculpt it into
its present state-a grotesque and emaciated form of the origi-
nal. Through this jurisprudence, the Court created many prob-
lems where few previously existed. The terrible toll taken by
Batson and its progeny is evident in cases such as Boyd and
Huey, which produced a circuit split over a trial procedure firmly
established since the beginning of our nation.
The Court should have the courage to disassociate itself with
its recent precedents and to cast its lot with the centuries of cas-
es upholding the unrestricted use of the peremptory challenge.
By returning the peremptory challenge to its former incarnation,
229. See, e.g., id. at 410-16 (explaining the criminal defendant's standing to raise
equal protection claims of an excluded juror).
230. See Smith & Ochoa, supra note 167, at 185.
231. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1965) (explaining how discrimi-
natory strikes had to be shown under this approach).
232. A survey of U.S. district court judges conducted by Smith and Ochoa revealed
that only 6.3% of the responding judges believed that a return to pre-Batson practic-
es would be beneficial. See Smith & Ochoa, supra note 167, at 188 tbl. 4.
233. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1000 [Vol. 39:961
19981 CURRENT STATE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 1001
the Court would, in one bold move, replace confusion with clari-
ty while sacrificing none of the protection deserved by defen-
dants, potential jurors, or the judicial system.
Coburn R. Beck
